The Role of the Indonesian Navy in Responding to Changes in the Maritime Boundary between Timor Leste and Australia in 2018 to the status of Indonesia's Maritime Territory in order to Maintain Defense and Security Country

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Abstract

After the ratification of the Treaty Between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste Establishing Their Maritime Bunderies in the Timor Sea on 31 May 2018, it marked the settlement of the maritime boundary dispute between the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste (RDTL) and Australia through the mechanism of the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The settlement of this maritime boundary dispute does not include Indonesia as a country that directly borders RDTL and Australia. The settlement of this maritime boundary dispute ignores the maritime boundary agreement between Indonesia and Australia in 1971 and 1972. RDTL and Australia ignore the agreement, resulting in duplication and contradiction. This study uses a qualitative method with a defense science and legal approach. The results of this study indicate that the maritime boundary agreement between RDTL and Australia is not in accordance with the provisions of international maritime law UNCLOS 1982. The drawing of maritime boundaries using meridian lines causes the sea boundaries to widen to the east and west. The Greater Sunrise area is mostly included in the RDTL sea area. This agreement is very detrimental to Indonesia in the fields of politics, economy, security and defense. In order to maintain the security and integrity of the national jurisdictional sea area, the Indonesian Navy continues to increase its Diplomatic, Police and Defense roles based on the 1971 and 1972 maritime boundary agreements and using the maritime map issued by Indonesia in 2017. The Indonesian government must be proactive in renegotiating with RDTL and Australia in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS 1982, the 1933 Montevideo Convention and the 1961 Vienna Convention.

Keywords: RDTL; *Australia maritime boundary agreement; resolution of maritime boundary disputes' role of the Indonesian Navy.*

INTRODUCTION

In 2016 Timor Leste filed a lawsuit against Australia through an International Arbitration regarding maritime boundaries. Through the Arbitration, the *Treaty Between Australia And the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was established establishing their Maritime Boundaries in The Timor Sea in 2018*. The determination of the sea boundary takes into account the legal, historical, economic and political aspects so that the permanent sea boundary is realized against the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and includes *The Greater Sunrise* and *the Joint Petroleum Development Area* (JPDA). The determination of the sea boundary which was created in 1971 and has an impact on political, economic, legal, defense and security aspects.

In 1971 Indonesia and Australia held negotiations and established non-permanent maritime boundaries on the east side (Arafuru Sea) and the west side of East Timor (Timor Sea). The agreement only determines the joint management of oil and gas resources in the Timor Gap. The Timor Gap is an area with a width of 240 Km or on the map between points A16 and A17 according to the agreement between Indonesia and Australia on October 9, 1972. The Timor Gap is part of the Indonesian continental shelf and is directly connected to the coast *of the Northern Territory of Australia*. The seabed of the Timor Gap contains oil and natural gas resources of high economic value. Therefore, it is important to determine permanent sea boundaries that are directly related to the state of managing

natural resources (*Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources*) as a strategy and sustainability of life in the future. This is in accordance with MU-UN Resolution Number 1803 (XVII) of 1962 *The Permanent Sovereignty* which affirms the right of a nation to use its natural resources in the context of development (*the right to development*) for the welfare of its people. Australia through the *Woodside* company had conducted oil exploration in *the Greate Sunrise field* before the Indonesian occupation of East Timor on December 7, 1975. Australia's marine resource exploration activities then became an obstacle in the negotiations for the determination of permanent sea boundaries between Indonesia and Australia (Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, 2003).

Before Timor Leste became independent, the Timor Sea and the Arafuru Sea were the seas that separated Indonesia and Australia through several agreements agreed in 1971 and 1972. Since the independence of Timor Leste in 2002, it has had an impact on the change of land, sea and air border areas between Indonesia and Timor Leste, including in the Timor Sea and the Arafuru Sea. The boundary change also concerns the sea boundary that was originally between Indonesia and Australia and now involves Timor Leste. Until now, there has been no maritime boundary agreement between Indonesia and Timor Leste after independence. The two countries have so far only completed the land boundary to the coastal boundary while the sea boundary has not reached an agreement, so it has the potential to pose traditional and non-traditional security threats.

Frequent violations such as *illegal entry, illegal fishing, illegal mining*, smuggling, illegal immigrants, shipping, foreign ships passing through Indonesian territorial waters without permission and so on. These violations are difficult to deal with due to Indonesia's limited capabilities. In addition to the above maritime boundary issues, in 2018 there was a maritime boundary agreement between Australia and Timor Leste through the Court of Arbitration, namely *Treaty Between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste Establishing Their Maritime Bounderies in the Timor Sea 31th May 2018* as the sea boundary of Astralia and Timor Leste.

The absence of a maritime boundary agreement between Indonesia and Australia and Timor Leste will cause duplication of authority in securing and enforcing Indonesia's maritime sovereignty. Likewise, in the management of marine natural resources, it will cause legal problems that must be solved first by these three countries. In order to secure and defend the territorial waters of Indonesian jurisdiction from various threats and disturbances on the eastern side, namely the Arafuru Sea and the southern side of the Timor Sea, the Indonesian Navy still has the authority as stipulated in Article 9 letter b of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army (TNI), namely carrying out the task of enforcing the law and maintaining security in the maritime area of national jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of national law and international law that Ratified. In addition to Article 9 letter c of the TNI law, the authority of the TNI Navy includes the task of carrying out the duties of naval diplomacy in order to support foreign policy determined by the government. This study analyzes the problems related to the role of the Indonesian Navy in responding to changes in the maritime boundary between the RDTL and Australia in 2018 on the status of Indonesia's maritime territory in order to maintain the security and defense of the State.

METHOD

This study uses a qualitative method, as stated by Moleong (2017:4) that qualitative research is one of the research procedures that produces descriptive data in the form of written or oral information from several people that can be observed. In qualitative research, emphasis is placed on many aspects in one variable so as to allow more in-depth research on the problem being studied. Qualitative research produces an overview (description) of the phenomenon being studied. Meanwhile, research is a strategy to achieve the research objectives that have been set and acts as a guide, guideline or guide for the researcher in the implementation of the research process.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Arrangement of Sea Boundaries According to Law

The regulation of maritime boundaries such as in Indonesia does have its own level of complexity in determining delimitation and agreements between intersecting countries. As an archipelago country, Indonesia has many territorial boundaries with 10 countries, namely India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Palau, PNG, Australia and Timor Leste. The

Government of the Republic of Indonesia has a national priority program, namely border diplomacy through negotiations on the affirmation of land boundaries and negotiations on the determination of sea boundaries. State boundary negotiations are one of the main actions in maintaining State sovereignty so that it does not cause conflicts. The implementation of land, sea and air boundary negotiations in accordance with Article 6 paragraph (2) of Law Number 43 of 2008 concerning State Territory which regulates the territorial boundaries of States is determined based on bilateral and/or trilateral (multilateral) agreements and the regulation of sea boundaries is based on the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982): 1) Article 2 of UNCLOS 1982 which regulates the sovereignty of States to the sea as a boundary that shows the existence of a country's territorial sovereignty; 2) Articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15 of UNCLOS 1982 regulate the settlement of maritime boundary disputes between States and Regions'4) Negotiations on the rights and obligations of states in resolving conflicts are regulated through the 1933 Montevideo Convention; and 5) The regulation of diplomatic relations in international dispute settlement is regulated through the 1961 Vienna Convention.

Article 5 of UNCLOS 1982 regulates how to determine the sea boundary measured through the usual base line on low water lines along the coast. The marine area of a coastal State includes the Archipelago Waters, Inland Waters and Territorial Seas, Additional Zones, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and Continental Shelf. The above provisions are a way of regulating sea boundaries according to sea zones in coastal states through bilateral and multilateral negotiation mechanisms. On the other hand, this convention also regulates the settlement of maritime boundaries through international instruments as stipulated in article 287 of UNCLOS 1982, namely: 1) *The International Tribunal for the Law of the sea stablished in accordance with Annex* VI; 2) *The International Court of Justice*; 3) *An Arbitral Tribunal Constituted in accordance with Annex VII for one or more of the categories disputes specified therin;* 4) A specialarbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII for one or more of the categories of dispute specified therin.

The settlement of maritime boundary disputes also involves international legal instruments related to diplomatic relations as outlined in a treaty as the basis of international law by the parties to the State (*state actors*) which must be obeyed together as stipulated in the 1933 *Montivideo Convention* concerning the rights and obligations of States, the prohibition of intervening in the internal or foreign affairs of other States. The regulation of maritime boundaries between States must also be based on other provisions of international law in the pursuit of diplomatic relations as stipulated in the 1961 Vienna Convention to reach an agreement. The agreement was then outlined in a bilateral and multilateral agreement as stipulated in the 1933 Montevideo Convention, the sea lion can be used for economic, environmental, political, legal, security and national and global interests.

Impact of the 2018 Maritime Boundary Agreement between the RDTL and Australia

The 2018 maritime border agreement between Timor Leste and Australia signed in New York ended the long dispute between the two countries in principle but on the other hand had an impact on Indonesia, including:

- 1. The agreement between Australia and Timor Leste implements the *Median Line Principles* (MLP) which can affect Indonesia's maritime boundaries. Timor Leste wants to get more profit sharing from the *Greater Sunrise Area* which is in the position *of the Joint Petroleum Development Area* (JPDA), which is a joint oil and gas management development area, so the boundaries of JDPA and *Greater Sunrise* must be drawn to the east to reach Sunrise. The eastern boundary covering JDPA and *Greater Sunrise* is the middle point of Timor Leste and Indonesia, so the change also affects the territory of Indonesia. Through MLP, approximately 80% of *Sunrise's source of wealth* was originally in Indonesian territory because it was closer to Indonesia than to Timor Leste. The essence of the Australian and Timor Leste maritime boundary agreement is to assert that the maritime boundary in the Timor Sea now includes the continental shelf boundary, the boundary of the exclusive economic zone which includes *the Greater Sunrise*.
- 2. Indonesia can review the 1971 and 1972 agreements between Australia and Indonesia in which the agreement agreed on a large part of the agreement based on the Continental Shelf agreement.
- 3. Australia's willingness to resolve maritime boundary disputes through the 1982 UNCLOS international maritime law mechanism needs to be questioned because Australia has not used it until now.

- The existence of the 2018 maritime boundary agreement between Australia and Timor Leste which does not involve Indonesia has an impact on legal uncertainty about the boundary between Australia
 Timor Leste Indonesia which has implications for the interests of the State's security and defense as well as the management of marine resources, especially the waters around the Timor Gap.
- 5. The impact of significant differences in the withdrawal of coordinate lines is not favorable to Indonesia. This happened because Indonesia has not been involved in the boundary negotiations between Timor Leste and Australia since 2016.

These impacts could trigger new disputes over the political, economic, security and defense aspects as well as international law of the three countries. If Indonesia asks for renegotiation, the unfavorable impact will be on Australia because it must also allow Indonesia to claim the rights to oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea considering several agreements that have occurred and are still in force that must be discussed further, including:

- 1. In 1989 Australia and Indonesia signed the *Timor Gap Treaty* (when Timor Leste was still integrated with Indonesia),
- 2. Timor Leste does not have a permanent sea while Indonesia and Australia share the natural resources in the Timor Gap.
- 3. In 2002 East Timor became independent and signed the *Timor Sea Treaty* but there were no sea border negotiations.
- 4. East Timor has long held to a maritime border with Australia having to be at the midpoint so much of the *Greater Sunrise* oil and gas area is on its territory.
- 5. In 2004 Timor Leste again held negotiations with Australia.
- 6. In 2006 the *Treaty on Certain Maritime Arragements in the Timor Sea* (CMATS) was signed, but the permanent maritime boundary has not yet been established and the oil and gas wealth from *the Greater Sunrise* will be divided equally between Timor Leste and Australia.

Another impact of the maritime boundary agreement between Australia and Timor Leste has implications for Australia's much longer border with Indonesia in the future, as Prime Minister Alexander Downer said in 2002 that redefining the maritime boundary with Timor Leste would risk renegotiation involving thousands of kilometers of boundaries with Indonesia. It should be re-observed that the map of the sea boundary between Australia-Timor Leste-Indonesia can cause potential problems because it places the boundary between Australia and Timor Leste at the midpoint which has an impact on overlapping with the sea boundary with Indonesia. The maritime boundary between Australia and Indonesia was agreed in 1971 when most of Australia's maritime boundary was still based on the continental shelf (*cadaster*) which far exceeded the average boundary and was very close to the coastline of the Indonesian islands. This overlap will affect Indonesia's authority in carrying out marine resource management, law enforcement and marine regional defense. Therefore, Indonesia needs to take a political stance to be more active in taking initiatives in meetings and talks between Indonesia, Timor Leste, and Australia to discuss the issue of overlapping maritime boundaries, the goal of which is to obtain legal certainty of the boundaries.

The Role of the Indonesian Navy in Responding to the 2018 Maritime Boundary Agreement between the RDTL and Australia in the Context of Securing and Enforcing the Sovereignty of Indonesia's Jurisdictional Sea Areas

Universally, the Navy around the world carries out three roles, as well as the Indonesian Navy. Kent Booth (1977) conveyed that the three roles include the Military Role, the Police Role and the Diplomacy Role, or called the Universal Naval Role Trinity.

The authority of the Indonesian Navy in carrying out the State's security and defense duties at sea based on national law and international law of the sea (UNCLOS 1982) in accordance with the jurisdiction zone over inland waters, archipelagic/archipelago waters, territorial seas, additional zones, EEZs, continental shelves and high seas as well as international seabed areas. From the scope of authority of this area of operation, the Indonesian Navy deploys equipment in the form of warships (KRI) and aircraft and synergizes with the Indonesian Air Force in operations, especially ALKI security. The main points of maritime security operations according to Kasal Decree Number Kep/575/IV/2015 dated April 2, 2015 concerning Guidelines for the Implementation of Maritime Security Operations (PUM-5.110) are known that law enforcement and maintaining security in the sea area of Indonesia's national jurisdiction are carried out based on national law and international law that have been ratified.

Marine security operations are carried out independently by the Indonesian Navy and integrated marine security operations with other components of marine power and other dimensions that have authority in the field of law enforcement at sea. Other components of power within the scope of ministries and institutions in charge of the sea include the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), the Director General of Sea Transportation of the Ministry of Transportation, the Director General of Immigration of the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Director General of Oil and Gas of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the National Narcotics Agency and the Indonesian Air Force.

This integrated maritime security operation is based on the rules of involvement of *the Rule of Engagement* (ROE) as stipulated in the Decree of the Commander of the TNI Number Skep/479/XI/2005 dated November 17, 2005 concerning the Rules for the Involvement of TNI Operation Units in Peacetime. The purpose of this maritime security operation is to create law enforcement in and through the sea in the sea area of Indonesia's national jurisdiction as follows: 1) Collecting data for the benefit of maritime intelligence; 2) Prevent and overcome violations of the law in the maritime area of Indonesia's national jurisdiction; 3) Securing trade and communication routes in the sea of Indonesia's national jurisdiction using international shipping routes or ALKI; 4) Law enforcement against certain criminal acts at sea; and 5) Maritime diplomacy according to government policy.

The role of the Indonesian Navy in its capacity as the main component is regulated in Article 5 jo Article 9 of Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army as a State tool in the field of defense in accordance with the State's policies and political decisions. The role of the Navy cannot be separated from its duties in accordance with Article 9 of the TNI law: a) carrying out the duties of the Navy in the field of defense; b) enforce the law and maintain security in the maritime area of national jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of national and international law that have been ratified; c) carrying out the duties of naval diplomacy in order to support the foreign policy set by the government; d) carry out the TNI's duties in the development and development of marine strength as well as; e) Carry out the empowerment of the maritime defense area. This provision shows that the Indonesian Navy as a tool of the State carries out its duties as a policeman (*Constabruray Role*), diplomacy (*Diplomacy*) and State defense (*Military*) at sea.

These three roles are based on international customs as written by Kent Booth which shows authority attributable and universal. In carrying out operations that are directly related to law enforcement at sea (*Constaburary Role*) to crack down on threats of violence, threats of navigation, violations of certain criminal acts at sea (*illegal fishing, illegal mining, illegal entry, illegal logging, illegal drugs,* and so on) as part of national jurisdiction.

Law enforcement at sea by the Indonesian Navy includes hot suits, arrests, detentions, investigations, investigations which are then processed at the prosecution level by the Prosecutor's Office. The authority of the Indonesian Navy as an investigator of certain crimes at sea is regulated through laws that specifically regulate both nationally and internationally. The authority of the Indonesian Navy in carrying out law enforcement, diplomacy and defense as stipulated in Articles 21, 73, 100, 111 of the 1982 UNCLOS which was later adopted in national law as a guideline for action.

The implementation of the security and enforcement of sea sovereignty in the territory of Indonesia's national jurisdiction by the Indonesian Navy in an integrated manner with other ministries and institutions will encounter obstacles if the maritime boundaries of Indonesia and neighboring countries do not have a clear legal status. Likewise, sea security in southern Indonesia, which borders Australia and Timor Leste, will encounter new problems after the 2018 sea boundary agreement was held by Timor Leste and Australia. While waiting for the approval of the determination of the maritime boundaries of the three States as stipulated in Article 74 of UNCLOS 1982 paragraph (3) it is stated that "While waiting for an agreement as specified in paragraph (1), the countries concerned shall make every effort to make provisional arrangements of a practical nature and during this transitional period shall not jeopardize or hinder the achievement of a final agreement."

In carrying out the daily tasks of the operations carried out by the Navy, it is organized by the Operations Implementation Command (Kolakops), namely Koarmada I, Koarmada II and Koarmada III. The main duties and roles of Koarmada II include several things as part of the authority of the Indonesian Navy which are technically carried out by Guspurla and Guskamla Koarmada II as follows:

1) Escort and patrol around the Arafuru Sea and the Timor Sea to be orderly, safe and prevent the occurrence of illegal fishing activities, natural resources, and cross-border crimes; 2) Enforcement of the Law of the Sea including arresting and prosecuting perpetrators of violations of international maritime law such as violations of state boundaries, environmental pollution, and other illegal activities; 3) Maritime cooperation with neighboring countries and relevant international institutions to strengthen sustainable maritime governance and facilitate cooperation in monitoring and law enforcement in the waters concerned; and 4) Operational Readiness in responding to emergency situations or security threats that occur, including supporting the management of natural disasters and emergencies at sea.

The Second Fleet has an important role in maintaining Indonesia's maritime sovereignty, enforcing international maritime law, and supporting the management of marine spatial planning on the southern side of the Arafuru Sea and the Timor Sea. These tasks are in line with the TNI Navy's mandate to protect Indonesia's maritime sovereignty and support national interests in the maritime sector. Synergy between the Indonesian Navy and ministries/institutions is very important in protecting and managing the sea.

CONCLUSION

The regulation of maritime boundaries according to international law is based on several important aspects, including: 1) international customs, 2) bilateral and multilateral treaties and 3) courts (*the international Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI, the International Court of Justice*), the Court of Arbitration (*an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII*), a special arbitral constituted in accordance with Annex VII for one or more of the catagories of disputes specified therin).

The impact of the Treaty *Between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste Establishing Their Maritime Bounderies in the Timor Sea* 31th May 2018 is problematic and legally flawed because it is duplicative, overlapping and contradictory to the existing maritime boundary agreements between Indonesia and Australia in 1971 and 1972 and cannot be unilaterally canceled or by other parties to be transferred as stipulated in Article 51 of the 1982 UNCLOS. The impact of the 2018 agreement includes political, legal, economic, security and defense impacts.

The role carried out by the Indonesian Navy includes the role of diplomacy, the role of the police, and the role of the military in maintaining the security and defense of the maritime area of national jurisdiction as the obligation of all components of the nation according to their respective authorities within the ministries/institutions.

The strategy in overcoming this problem is carried out with the main goal (<u>ends</u>) is to minimize the impact that causes new problems and overcome the potential impacts that exist in the ocean can be managed properly by humanity. To realize this goal, the *way* that can be taken is to propose an initiative to open negotiations between three countries, namely Indonesia-Timor Leste and Australia related to the Conciliation procedure and the interpretation of the substance of the agreement agreed by presenting Indonesia as a country that directly borders their maritime boundaries.

The strategy that can be taken in carrying out the role of the Indonesian Navy with the aim (*Ends*) so as not to create a vacuum in the control of the maritime area of national jurisdiction, the Indonesian Navy continues to carry out the task of securing and defending the sea dimension in the area based on the boundaries set in 1971 and 1972 which are in line with the sea map published by the Pushidrosal in 2017.

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